Monstrosity Exhibition by Crockett, Clayton
[Expositions 4.1&2 (2010) 114-122]  Expositions (online) ISSN: 1747-5376 
 
Monstrosity Exhibition 
CLAYTON CROCKETT 
University of Central Arkansas 
 
Asylums with doors open wide, 
Where people had paid to see inside, 
For entertainment they watch his body twist 
Behind his eyes he says, ‘I still exist.’ 
This is the way, step inside… 
You'll see the horrors of a faraway place, 
Meet the architects of law face to face. 
See mass murder on a scale you've never seen, 
And all the ones who try hard to succeed. 
This is the way, step inside. 
–Joy Division, “Atrocity Exhibition” 
 
 
Creston Davis has pulled off a remarkable encounter by setting John Milbank and Slavoj Žižek 
up against each other in The Monstrosity of Christ.
1
 His introduction lays out the theological 
stakes of this exchange, which involves both the reevaluation of Hegel‟s philosophy for 
philosophical and theological thinking, and more importantly, the resources of theology to 
oppose contemporary capitalism (4). In the 1990s, both Milbank‟s invigorated Radical 
Orthodoxy and Žižek‟s strikingly fresh Hegelian-Lacanian philosophy jolted readers out of their 
moribund complacency with regard to capitalism. Both offered new resources to think and act 
against and beyond the suffocating “infinite undulations of the snake,” as Gilles Deleuze puts it 
in his “Postscript on the Societies of Control.”2 Today, at the end of the first decade of the 
twenty-first century, we are much better placed to evaluate their respective contributions. This 
exchange on paradox vs. dialectic is a clear and illuminating encounter that shows not only how 
united Žižek and Milbank are on what they oppose, but also how profoundly divergent their 
theological visions are.  
In this book, Žižek throws his lot in with Protestant death of God theology, as fundamentally 
shaped by Hegel‟s thought and expressed theologically in the work of Thomas J.J. Altizer, 
whereas Milbank elaborates his positive Catholic vision of Christian harmony and 
transcendence. Structurally, however, this is not an equal exchange, and Žižek has both the first 
(after Davis‟s introduction) and last word, with Milbank caught in the middle. Furthermore, this 
debate spills beyond the book into the pages of a recent issue of the journal Political Theology, 
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where both reiterate their positions and where ultimately, as Žižek admits, “our exchange has 
exhausted its potentials.”3 Žižek is correct in the terms in which it takes place, although that does 
not mean that the questions themselves are exhausted; in fact, in the same issue of Political 
Theology Joshua Delpech-Ramey raises an important question, namely, whether it might be 
possible to foresee and hold open other versions of transcendence besides the orthodox Catholic 
one that Milbank champions.
4
 
So who is right? Well, to employ Žižek‟s provocative understanding of the Hegelian triad, we 
have to understand first that neither Milbank nor Žižek is fundamentally correct in their 
theological understanding of the Christ. Second, there is the temptation to imagine that the 
correct position is “between” Žižek and Milbank, and this is how sublation is usually understood. 
But we cannot sublate Milbank and Žižek and get to the authentic, true version of Christ. What 
Žižek‟s interpretation of Hegel teaches us is that to get to the right meaning of something, Christ 
in this case, you have to subtract. So, the correct interpretation is a subtraction from Žižek‟s 
position. In this sense, the “true” theological position lies not between Žižek and Milbank, but 
rather between Žižek and John D. Caputo, as I will explain. I will also associate this position 
with Deleuze, and reflect briefly on the monstrosity – the Crucifixion and Resurrection – of 
Christ and the death of God from the perspective of Deleuze‟s thought.  
Another lesson of Žižek‟s interpretation of Hegel is that you cannot get to the correct reading 
directly; you have to go through the wrong ones. So, in the spirit of Hegel and Žižek, I will go 
through the reading of Milbank on paradox and then the reading of Žižek on dialectic and show 
why they are “wrong,” before turning to the right interpretation. In his response to Žižek, 
Milbank elaborates his impressive Catholic vision of transcendence. In contrast to Žižek‟s 
dialectical version of Christianity, Milbank claims that “there is a radically Catholic humanist 
alternative to this, which sustains transcendence only because of its commitment to incarnational 
paradox” (117). Dialectics, Protestant Christianity, and all of secular modernity is wrong, 
because it forecloses Catholic transcendence and ends up with an atheist nihilism. Material 
reality can only be meaningful if there is “recognition of a mediating link between matter and 
spirit” that atheistic materialism denies (125). Milbank‟s incredible erudition is marshaled to 
force an unavoidable either/or: either dialectical atheist nihilism or paradoxical Catholic 
transcendence that can along retrieve and restore beauty in a harmonious world (158, 165). He 
gives a phenomenological account of driving along windy roads in the mist, from which things 
emerge and stand out in an evocatively intense way (160–63). The background mist and the 
forms that stand out from it exist “in a mutually constitutive tension” that is experienced as 
“mutually affirming” (163). Ultimately, transcendence mediates material reality in a way that 
allows it to be experienced as beautiful and meaningful in itself, and without this Catholic 
transcendence we lose the thread that stitches our world together for us as a world. This “genuine 
mediation […] remains to the end – even in God and as God” (166).  
It is because we have meaningful, true and beautiful experiences that we know and trust that 
transcendence mediates and provides for the possibility of these experiences in a paradoxical 
way. Milbank claims that “the soil of the finite, within our experience […] paradoxically „runs 
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out‟ into the sands of the infinite” (168). I do not want to deny the richness of either Milbank‟s 
language or these phenomenal experiences, but I do think that he exploits them in order to paint 
his over-arching metaphysical picture of a harmonious, transcendent world that is ultimately an 
illusion. Not that beauty does not exist, but it‟s not the only thing that does exist, and the 
existence of beauty does not exclude its opposite. Milbank wants to have his transcendent cake 
and eat it materially too. Is that too much to ask? Yes and no. It‟s natural to want cake but that 
doesn‟t mean that some grain or wheat doesn‟t have to die in order for you to bake and eat it.  
The idea of the God-Man, which is the paradox of the Incarnation, “may be an absurd 
mystery, but it strangely seems to clarify the mystery of the huge gulf between human beings and 
mere animals” (170). Here Milbank sets up a gulf in material physical reality that seems odd 
given his desire for material and metaphysical harmony. Why are animals “mere” animals? 
Because they lack “creativity, self-mutation, and new accessions of power” that are the 
provenance of human beings (170). Milbank wants to re-enchant nature, all of it, although he still 
runs up against some difficulties, such as, in this passage, the gulf between humans and animals. 
His Anglo-Catholic vision is no doubt appealing, but it seems incredible in relation to the 
complexity of experience, unless that experience is honed and shaped into the forced choice that 
Milbank wants us to face. On the one hand, modern culture operates with an explicit or implicit 
notion of progress, such that non-modern values are seen as irrelevant and obsolete. Milbank 
paints us an attractive picture of a non-modern world, and these non-modern values are 
important insofar as they provide alternatives to modern and contemporary capitalism and its 
value system. On the other hand, Milbank‟s project seems impossible and undesirable in its 
attempt to restore a Catholic world that is medieval at its heart, because it is based on an imperial 
vision of Christianity that is incompatible with a pluralistic world no matter how dressed up in 
postmodern terms.  
Milbank stresses the contingency of Western history. He claims that “one should ascribe the 
historical triumph of the modern rather than the ancient model not to any outworking of a 
material logic but to contingent processes of ideological and political struggle” (183). He asserts 
the contingency of Protestant modernity, and he appeals to this contingency to counter the 
inexorability of its processional logic, but he fails to radicalize that contingency to Christianity 
itself. Why should Christianity have emerged as the religion of the West, other than as a result of 
processes of “ideological and political struggle”? Why not Stoicism, paganism, Buddhism, or 
Islam? Milbank sees the problem with Protestant/modern/dialectical supercessionism, and he 
offers an alternative, but at the same time he legislates an unavoidable and unsurpassable 
medieval worldview. He claims that “we are still living out a „certain‟ Middle Ages that is 
univocalist, voluntarist, nominalistically equivocal, and arcanely gnostic,” that we mistake for 
modernity (218). “It is time,” however, “that we abandoned the paganism of progress and 
recovered a more authentic Middle Epoch” (218). This Epoch would necessarily be Christian and 
Western.
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Žižek pursues to its radical end this logic of contingency and necessity, which is also 
necessarily Western and Christian. But he also perceives that the universality of Western 
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Christianity is simply the flip side of the universal logic of capital, which is truly universal at a 
global level. Žižek‟s gospel is not ordinarily seen as “good news,” but he is a better theologian 
than Milbank, at least in terms of radical theology as opposed to orthodox theology. Žižek says 
that “my claim is that it is Milbank who is in effect guilty of heterodoxy, ultimately of a 
regression to paganism: in my atheism, I am more Christian than Milbank” (248). Most forms of 
orthodox theology are heretical in the etymological sense – they consist of picking and choosing 
histories, rules, doctrines, and beliefs that are then imagined as a tradition and a truth. Žižek 
opposes this fantastic wishful thinking of theology with his hard-core Christian atheism. Here the 
truth of Christianity is that God dies on the cross: “Incarnation is the birth of Christ, and after his 
death, there is neither Father nor Son but „only‟ the Holy Spirit, the spiritual substance of the 
religious community” (33). The lesson of Christ‟s life and death is that God becomes human and 
dies, really dies, and does not continue to exist. Of course Žižek does not believe that God really 
expires, but rather that what the crucifixion teaches us is that God does not exist, but not in the 
stereotypically atheist way. God really doesn‟t exist, and the Other does not exist, and the 
crucifixion is the dialectical gap between God and Godself, which is the same gap at the heart of 
human being, as well as reality as a whole.  
Žižek appeals to Altizer‟s apocalyptic Hegelian theology as a counterpoint to the “„soft‟ 
postmodern theology” of Caputo, which in its post-secular guise of religion without religion is 
“aseptic, lifeless, bloodless, lacking the properly religion passion […] in comparison with 
someone like Altizer” (260). Žižek ends up affirming the radical core of Christianity over against 
post-secular religious appropriations of postmodern insights dressed up in Christian garb. This 
can be rhetorically appealing, but it is also somewhat disingenuous, because Žižek appropriates 
these same postmodern insights and then positions himself as somehow beyond them. Notions 
like violence, truth, hardcore theology and sexual frankness appeal to him as ways to tweak the 
political correctness of contemporary multiculturalism, even though Žižek personally is not 
nearly as monstrous as he wants to appear at times. This is not in any way to dismiss Žižek‟s 
philosophy, which is incredibly important. His reading of Hegel and German idealism through 
Lacan is absolutely stunning and brilliant, and his analysis of popular culture through films, 
music and other phenomena is sharp and powerful. Furthermore, Žižek is resolutely Leftist and 
refuses to compromise with corporate capitalism. Finally, his religious insights are sincere and 
extremely relevant. I just think that he exaggerates his distance from postmodernism and its 
representatives like Derrida, Caputo, and others, in order to appeal to readers who are turned off 
by stereotypical distortions of these thinkers. At the same time, there is a sense in which the 
movement of postmodernism is a politically conservative phenomenon, which is why Derrida 
resisted the term, despite its embrace by so many English speaking readers.  
So in his reading of Hegel and Christianity, Žižek emphasizes irreducible conflicts, deadlocks 
that he exaggerates in his dialectical readings, and this is from where Milbank draws the 
conclusion of nihilism. But I think that Milbank goes too far; these dialectical deadlocks are not 
nihilistic because they are ultimately resolved, but the resolution is not a conventional sublation. 
Rather, the resolution is the cutting of a Gordian knot, the dissolution of the conflict as such. 
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However, the question remains to what extent Žižek has over-emphasized the conflictual nature 
of the deadlock itself in order to provide his own brilliant solution. Žižek asserts that “something 
traumatic erupts in death-of-God theology, something that is covered up by postmodern 
theology,” which is the insight that all of Christianity consists of a psychoanalytic defense 
mechanism deployed against “the traumatic apocalyptic core of incarnation/death/ resurrection” 
(260). So the event of Christianity is an incredibly traumatic event, as one might imagine the 
death of Christ on the cross should be, but Christianity itself as a religion consists of an 
incredible repression of the reality and truth of that event. But there is always a return of the 
repressed and this traumatic apocalyptic kernel keeps insisting itself, which is what keeps 
Christianity going, and also what drives Western history. So is the spirit of Christianity also the 
spirit of the West? And what relation does this spirit have to the spirit of capitalism? Does 
capitalism also have a traumatic core, or is its core the complete absence of trauma, at least at its 
center? Does not capitalism always spit out squashed birds at the margins, like a Hegelian 
machine run amuck?  
Žižek says that “for Christianity, the true miracle is not the dead Christ walking around, but 
the love in the collective of believers” (291). But isn‟t that also what Caputo says in The 
Weakness of God when he opposes the miracle of the event to magic and resuscitated bodies? 
Maybe it‟s simply that Caputo doesn‟t devote enough time to what Žižek says is the condition of 
the miracle, which is “the bird‟s body squashed somewhere – like Christ on the Cross, this 
supreme squashed bird” (291). The reference here is to a magic trick from the film The Prestige. 
A little bird disappears, seemingly killed, and then reappears miraculously. When a little boy 
asserts that they are not the same bird, the magician denies it, but later you see him, as Žižek 
explains, “throwing a squashed bird into a trash can – the boy was right” (286). Hegelian 
synthesis seems like a cheap trick, but you have to keep in mind there is always a squashed bird 
somewhere. Christianity fastens itself upon the squashed bird. In her novel Surfacing, Margaret 
Atwood has an unnamed narrator come upon a dead heron senselessly killed and strung up in the 
Canadian wilderness. Her character reflects: 
 
Whether it died willingly, consented, whether Christ died willingly, anything that 
suffers and dies instead of us is Christ; if they didn‟t kill birds and fish they would have 
killed us. The animals die that we may live, they are substitute people, hunters in the 
fall killing deer, that is Christ also. And we eat them, out of cans or otherwise; we are 
eaters of death, dead Christ-flesh resurrecting inside us, granting us life. Canned Spam, 
canned Jesus, even the plants must be Christ. But we refuse to worship; the body 
worships with blood and muscle but the thing in the knob head will not, wills not to, the 
head is greedy, it consumes but does not give thanks.
6
 
 
Žižek says that Hegel is the true Christian philosopher, because his speculative dialectical 
standpoint demonstrates that the Crucifixion and the Resurrection “should be perceived not as 
two separate events, but as a purely formal parallax shift on one and the same event: Crucifixion 
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is Resurrection – to see this, one has only to include oneself in the picture. When the believers 
gather, mourning Christ‟s death, their shared spirit is the resurrected Christ” (291, Žižek‟s 
emphasis). This is correct; the only distance is the necessary temporal delay that is required to 
shift from the first position (Crucifixion) to the second (Resurrection). And also to keep one‟s 
eye on the trick, because there are always at least two birds. Christianity focuses one‟s attention 
on the broken body of Jesus precisely so that believers do not pay any attention to the other 
bird(s), whether Jewish or pagan. Or today, Muslim.  
The fact that according to the interpretation of René Girard Christianity is the sole religion 
that exposes the mechanism of mimetic violence and scapegoating does not mean that it ceases 
to function; it functions all the more effectively and insidiously for all that by scapegoating the 
religions like Islam that do not overcome substitutional violence. Take also the more traditional 
claim, that Christianity is the religion that absolutizes Christ‟s sacrifice in order to put an end to 
sacrifice. But sacrifice does not end; it gets taken to a whole „nother level, as Nietzsche pointed 
out in The Genealogy of Morals. We could say, with Weber, that capitalism is the highest and 
most sublime spirit of Christianity, because sacrifice is entirely overcome, and the most selfish 
greed accords with the best and most perfect wealth. There is something monstrous about all of 
this, including the elimination of externalities that allows us to drive birds and other animals to 
extinction while celebrating them in zoos and on nature shows.  
I claim that Deleuze offers resources to better understand the death of God and the 
monstrosity of Christ than either Milbank or Žižek. Deleuze‟s notion of the death of God is less 
Christocentric than Žižek‟s, and in Difference and Repetition7 he explains it in reference to time. 
In Chapter 2, “Repetition for Itself,” Deleuze elaborates three syntheses of time, which roughly 
correspond to present (habit), past (memory), and future (eternal return). The transition from the 
second to the third synthesis occurs along a break that is opened up by Kantian transcendental 
philosophy. According to Deleuze, “if the greatest initiative of transcendental philosophy was to 
introduce the form of time into thought as such, then this pure and empty form in turn signifies 
indissolubly the death of God, the fractured I and the passive self” (87). Instead of setting the self 
in time in an ontological sense, Kant places time within the self, and this division between the 
active (apperceptive) and passive self splits the self in two.  
Why would the splitting of the self lead to the death of God? Because Descartes founds the 
modern idea of God upon the self as the cogito. “God survives as long as the I enjoys a 
subsistence, a simplicity and an identity which expresses the entirety of its resemblance to the 
divine” (86). Deleuze claims that the pure and empty form of time that Kant isolates at the heart 
of the self also accomplishes the death of God. This is a non-dialectical, non-Hegelian version of 
the death of God.
8
 The pure and empty form of time constitutes the third and final synthesis of 
time for Deleuze, and it is the break or caesura of this form of time that opens onto a future. The 
past, the present and the future are all distinct forms of repetition, and it is the third form of time 
that concerns the eternal return, and Deleuze‟s appropriation of Nietzsche.  
The “repetition of the future as eternal return” is a kind of repetition that “affects only the 
new, what is produced under the conditions of default and by the intermediary of 
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metamorphosis” (90). The conventional reading of Nietzsche‟s idea of the eternal return is the 
return of the same; the idea that everything returns exactly and identically. Deleuze claims that 
this is a misunderstanding of the eternal return: only what becomes returns, or what becomes 
differently. The eternal return is repetition by excess, and it excludes all identity, including “my 
own identity, the identity of the self, the world, and God” (91). If Deleuze is right, and only that 
which is different returns, then there is no self-identity that can be substantialized or eternalized, 
including that of God.  
To think the death of God is to think the death of the self, and the impossibility of human and 
divine identity. This death, however, is an opening, a passage not to some higher form of 
identity, but to a future that is different because it returns, or repeats. This death does not lead to 
a future resurrection, but in fact it is directly resurrection. Resurrection properly understood is 
the new, the different that emerges out of the process of repetition or iteration that becomes the 
future. We can attempt to cling to our identity, but it is a false identity, and a more reactionary 
kind of death, death as claustrophobic suffocation.  
With Deleuze, though, we can think about the death of Jesus as the death of God, as the death 
of identity that opens onto a future, a repetition of difference beyond identity. In terms of 
Deleuze‟s book The Logic of Sense,9 Jesus offers up a body that suffers passion and death, which 
is the reality of his crucifixion, whereas his resurrection refers to the sense of this death, which 
appears nonsensical in conventional terms. For Deleuze, there are two series: a series of signs 
and a series of bodies, and the series of signs express what the series of bodies endure (23). An 
event is the sense that the series of signs express, but the impetus for an event is embedded in (a) 
body, and occurs as a wound. Events are actualized in sense as the expression of a trauma, a cut, 
or a wound, which is why “every event is a kind of plague, war, wound or death” (151). Christ is 
the sign of a death/body that is proclaimed by his followers like Peter and Paul as life, an event 
that has revolutionary sense. The cut of the crucifixion is the intensity that drives the repetition 
that constitutes Christianity, and this process is singular to Christianity but not exclusive to it. 
We could also think about cosmic Buddha-bodies, ethical Jewish bodies, whirling Sufi bodies, 
and subtle Hindu bodies, among others, that constitute different dispersals, and distinct relations 
between body and sense.  
It is not that Jesus dies, and then he is resurrected, and that event holds the promise for our 
own resurrection after death so long as we believe in it. It is not that Jesus dies, and he is then 
resurrected in us, the community of believers in Christ, as Žižek has it. It is that the message of 
Jesus‟ death is the resurrection, purely and simply. Christ dies, and this is precisely good news. 
Everyone dies. In his book The Weakness of God,
10
 Caputo provides a thinking of resurrection 
that has affinities with Deleuze, even though Caputo does not explicitly refer to Deleuze in his 
discussion.  
In chapter 11 of The Weakness of God, in his reading of the Lazarus story, Caputo claims that 
“rebirth and resurrection – that is what the kingdom is all about” (237). This resurrection, that 
Jesus performs in the case of Lazarus, is the “singular transformation from death to life,” but it is 
a not a magical transformation that reverses the decomposition of a rotting body (238). Caputo 
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discusses the time of the world in terms of ruined time, which is evil. Not that worldly 
temporality is evil, but the crushing of possibilities is evil, the destructive power of pain and 
death. In contrast to ruined time, Caputo brings in what Levinas calls “the time of salvation,” 
which pertains to the event. Salvation means “being saved from ruined time for a new time” 
(241). 
The redemption of a person like Lazarus seems to mean either the resuscitation of his body or 
the elevation of his soul to a state of eternal life, but I do not think that Caputo‟s view of time is 
either reversible or dialectic/dualistic. Salvation is a miracle of new life, but it is wholly situated 
“not in a heavenly pleasure but in the pain of the present” (252). We can only be saved by the 
other, by the appearance of a new birth, a child as the miracle of a new beginning, beyond death 
but not outside of death. Lazarus is also a squashed bird. According to Caputo, “Neither time nor 
salvation, neither rebirth nor resurrection, is possible in the solitary ego” (252). Reading Caputo 
in the context of Deleuze, resurrection can be understood not as the self-transcendence of the ego 
into another, higher (soul) form of ego. Rather, life is a resurrection or rebirth, because it is 
predicated upon and conditioned by death, even as death is only possible for what lives. Lazarus 
is not a person who was dead and then was physiologically restored to life by some magic spell 
cast by Jesus, and Jesus is not another (very special, even super-human) person who was 
physiologically restored to life magically by a transcendent divine being.  
As I read Caputo and Deleuze, the message of Jesus is that death is resurrection and rebirth, 
and that the only kind of death that does not constitute resurrection is the suffocation-death of an 
enclosed or imprisoned ego. So long as we try to preserve and maintain our ego, our persistent 
identity, we can only die. But only insofar as we release our identity and recognize that we are 
not, the death of the self is the resurrection because it is the gate by way of becoming anew. 
Becoming is becoming differently, becoming in and as difference, and the death of God and self 
are the only possibilities for resurrection, because that death is resurrection itself, which is 
immediately divine. We can either reactively cling to life, which delivers it over to death, and 
then our death seals this death-in-life cutting it off in an impossible manner; or we can embrace 
and accept death as the opening up and out of ourselves as we recur differently and eternally, but 
not as us.  
As I read Milbank and Žižek, Milbank wants a theology in which death simply has no place – 
there are no squashed birds. Žižek, on the other hand, comes incredibly close to the position I 
have just set out in terms of Deleuze and Caputo, but he wants to assert a quasi-dogmatic mode 
of Christianity along with the formal parallax that he explicates. Žižek‟s Hegelian framework 
threatens to overwhelm and over-determine the process of repetition, insofar as history appears 
as the working out of an internal (Protestant) teleology. So to sum up my response to this 
extraordinary book: the correct theoretical understanding of the monstrosity of Christ lies 
precisely between Žižek and Caputo, held together by the tension between Caputo‟s affirmation 
of Jesus‟ genuinely paradoxical – as opposed to Milbank‟s contrived paradoxes – anarchic logic 
of the kingdom in The Weakness of God and Žižek‟s dialectical elaboration of the Christ‟s 
crucifixion and resurrection.  
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